

**THE PROPOSED ASSOCIATED BRITISH PORTS (EASTERN RO-RO TERMINAL)
DEVELOPMENT CONSENT ORDER**

DEADLINE 5

Response on behalf of the Harbour Master, Humber
to Deadline 4 submissions from DFDS and Immingham Oil Terminal Operators

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Introduction

1.1. In this document Harbour Master, Humber (“**HMH**”) responds to the submissions made at deadline 4 by DFDS Seaways Plc (“**DFDS**”) and Associated Petroleum Terminals (Immingham) Limited and Humber Oil Terminals Trustee Limited (“**IOTT**”).

1.2. The documents addressed in this submission are:

1.2.1. REP4 – 024 - DFDS’ comments on Deadline 3 submissions

1.2.2. REP4- 023 – DFDS responses to ExAQ2

1.2.3. REP4-025 - DFDS -Summary of case made at ISH3

1.2.4. REP4-035 - IOT comments on D3 submissions, responses to ExQ2 and other ISH3 questions:

1.2.4.1. - Comments on HMH D3 submissions relating to IOT; and

1.2.4.2. Submissions – page 30 onwards

1.3. The fact that HMH has not responded to any particular point does not mean that he agrees with it or accepts that it is correct. HMH has limited his responses to matters that are directly relevant to his areas of responsibility and where he thinks he can assist the Examining Authority.

2. Table of responses:

Document	Content of D4 Submission	Response on behalf of the Harbour Master, Humber
<p>REP4 – 024</p> <p>DFDS’ comments on Deadline 3 submissions</p> <p>(e) HMH’s comments on DFDS D2 subs - paragraphs 38 to 46</p>	<p>38. DFDS note with concern the limited input from the Harbour Master and the Dock Master both in terms of verbal and written contributions to hearings or submissions. Both positions are extremely important when it comes to safe navigation and their input must be truly independent and unconstrained at all times.</p>	<p><i>Harbour Master, Humber Response</i></p> <p>HMH participated as he considered appropriate during the hearings and whenever requested to do so.</p> <p>HMH rejects out of hand any suggestion that his input was anything other than independent and unconstrained.</p>
<p>Ditto</p>	<p>39. Paragraph 3.1.8 - The Humber Master Humber (HMH) notes that, in regards to the effect of ship’s wash on a tug: ‘was not raised as an issue by the tug operators, either at the simulations at which HMH was</p>	<p><i>Harbour Master, Humber Response</i></p> <p>HMH can only report his direct experience of the simulations at which he was present and the feedback he received from members of his team who were present at the previous</p>

	<p>present, or to him separately’. DFDS notes that as far as DFDS is aware the HMH only participated in the stakeholder simulations in November 2022 (all of which were conducted to Berth 1, the least challenging berth) which in general were conducted with less power usage and less tug usage than previous simulations but also using much smaller vessels than the Jinling class ships. HMH noted in a meeting with DFDS 13 October 2022 that he had not read the simulation reports APP-090 (Superseded by AS-022) and APP-091 (superseded by AS-023) and so at this point was unaware of these issues that DFDS raised.</p>	<p>simulations and reported a lack of any adverse feedback from tug operators.</p> <p>HMH has already responded in his document HMH 12 - REP4-032 (see paragraphs 3.3 to 3.5) regarding the meeting with DFDS that he attended. As already explained, this is an unfair representation of what was said at that meeting and HMH.</p>
Ditto	<p>40. Paragraph 3.1.2 – The timings of the proposed IERRT vessels are expected to largely coincide with those of DFDS services bound for the IOH. As such the suggestion that vessels could stem ‘uptide’ off the Western Jetty rather than the Eastern seems to ignore the fact that it will be at times when the IOH is busy with arrivals or departures and in suggesting this option is simply displacing the disruption from one customer to another.</p>	<p>Harbour Master, Humber Response</p> <p>HMH accepts that additional vessel movements have some impact on operational flexibility but, in terms of overall capacity, all the vessels can berth safely.</p> <p>It is worth noting that vessels are already required to give notice of their proposed voyage timings to allow for the most efficient programming of vessel movements. That will remain the case whenever new infrastructure is introduced to the Humber.</p>
Ditto	<p>41. Paragraph 3.1.3 – the Standing Notice To Mariners SH22 states: ‘Order of turn will be determined strictly by stemming times at the passing of either the Outer Binks Light Buoy or Outer Sea Reach Light Buoy or Outer Rosse Reach Light Buoy as appropriate and as recorded by VTS, Humber.’ This indicates that stemming is on a ‘first come first served basis’.</p>	<p>Harbour Master, Humber Response</p> <p>DFDS will be aware that this applies only to vessels entering Immingham Dock. The DFDS vessels using Immingham Outer Harbour are currently managed separately, as would be the case for vessels using IERRT.</p>

Ditto	<p>43. Paragraph 3.1.6 – The Harbour Master appears to have misunderstood our general assertion here that the way in which tugs were used in the simulations is unrealistic both in terms of positioning relative to the stern ramp and the fact that the simulation does not account for the effect of ships wash onto the tugs and the loss of directional stability this creates.</p>	<p>Harbour Master, Humber Response</p> <p>HMH is aware of the issues raised by DFDS but notes that these trials were considered both safe and appropriate by experienced pilots and PECs and the experienced tug operators present.</p> <p>The point being made in paragraph 3.1.6 of HMH 10 was in relation to the size of the tugs used in the simulations. HMH stresses that appropriate requirements for use of tugs will be worked up if the Proposed Scheme is authorised, based on vast experience of navigating Ro-Ro vessels to and from jetties in the Humber.</p> <p>The matters raised by DFDS are, in the opinion of HMH, manageable and not a reason to refuse permission for the proposed new infrastructure at this location.</p>
Ditto	<p>44. Paragraph 3.1.8 - as the simulations do not recreate the effect of a ship's wash on a tugs skeg (the large fin beneath the tug's hull) which provides directional stability) it means that the tug operators would not have felt the effect of this wash, nor is it realistically represented visually so the skippers would not have been aware of the amount of power the vessel was using or appreciating the very real world danger this represents.</p> <p>45. Paragraph 3.1.9 - DFDS carries out simulation with multiple stakeholders at various simulation centres around Europe and always strives to make these as stringent and realistic as possible. DFDS does operate such criteria at other simulation locations (at the direction of the simulation centre experts) and will in future simulations ensure</p>	<p>Harbour Master, Humber Response</p> <p>HMH reiterates that the simulations were all attended by experienced tug operators who are aware of both the limitations of simulation and the real-life challenges of operating with Ro-Ro vessels.</p> <p>HMH does not intend to get into an argument with DFDS regarding who does the most simulations and how stringent they are. HMH was speaking of his own experience of conducting many simulations with DFDS over the years. His experience is that the criteria that DFDS asserts ought to have been used by ABP, have not been used by DFDS in those of its own simulations with which HMH has</p>

	<p>these are understood and followed in all simulations carried out with the applicant moving forward. However, to the best of our knowledge at no point in any previous DFDS simulations has the bow thruster run at 100% for such extended periods nor such excessive engine power employed to complete a manoeuvre as our experienced masters know this to be unrealistic and dangerous.</p>	<p>been involved. He cannot speak to the how DFDS has carried out its simulations elsewhere in Europe.</p>
Ditto	<p>46. Paragraph 3.3 - it is not the case that DFDS assumes the IERRT vessels will move freely whilst all other vessels are inconvenienced. The point DFDS is flagging is that adding 6 movements a day (4 net movements) in an area that is already very busy will inevitably lead to congestion and in order to achieve separation of vessels there has to be inconvenience to existing traffic irrespective of the order in which this is achieved.</p>	<p>Harbour Master, Humber Response</p> <p>HMH has already explained the position in relation to capacity on the estuary and operational flexibility. In the view of HMH, the additional movements associated with IERRT can be accommodated safely. That is the extent of his remit.</p>
<p>REP4- 023 – DFDS responses to ExAQ2</p>	<p>NS.2.32 – Use of tugs with Ro-Ro vessels</p> <p>Due to the design of some Ro-Ro vessels the tugs need to operate at 45 degrees to the vessel at all times, to prevent tugs lines from being stretched across the sharp edges of the stern ramp, due to the considerable amount of stored energy in a tugs line when under strain there is a danger of ‘snapback’ in which a parted line recoils in opposite directions from the point of failure and has the potential to damage the ramp structure and cause injury to both the ship’s crew and tugboat personnel. An example of this danger was highlighted in the MAIB’s incident report regarding a fatality on the Wah Shan (2012) (see Appendix 2). The use of tugs at this</p>	<p>Harbour Master, Humber Response</p> <p>There is extensive experience of pilots, PECs and tug operators working with large Ro-Ro vessels on the Humber where the risks highlighted are known, well-understood and carefully managed.</p> <p>While the Wah Shan incident involved snapback, it occurred on a bulk carrier while making fast a tug’s line and is not directly relevant to the specific risks associated with Ro-Ro vessels.</p>

	<p>angle adds extra time to arrival and departures as a vessel need to land app 30 meters prior to position or move forward 30 meters before tug can have a safe and efficient operation.</p>	
Ditto	<p>NS.2.33 – effects arising from contingency of lack of tug availability</p> <p>If it is determined tugs are required for a safe arrival or departure and they are not available, it would require the vessel to wait until such tugs become available. This is obviously more complex for arriving vessels rather than departing vessels depending upon when the master and/or pilot became aware of the delay which may require the vessel to wait in a safe location within the estuary or return to sea. For departures, issues arise when tug delays extend for a period of hours as pilots will generally disembark after a fixed waiting period and a new pilot must be ordered for the vessel which can compound the delays. Delays of any origin are potentially far reaching for a scheduled liner service as it can take several days for a service to ‘catch-up’ with their schedule and the associated disruption this causes to operations and customers</p>	<p>Harbour Master, Humber Response</p> <p>While HMM understands the importance of commercial consequences, he is primarily concerned with the safety of the vessels and would not compromise safety to avoid commercial consequences.</p>
Ditto	<p>NS.2.34 – current direction in the approach area to the Proposed Development berths</p> <p>The direction of the current is intrinsic to the safe operation of the berth, the way in which manoeuvres are conducted, and the towage requirements imposed. Although 10-15 degrees may sound minimal it would have a noticeable effect on a vessel of the size the Applicant</p>	<p>Harbour Master, Humber Response</p> <p>It has already been explained that there is no such difference expected in the current direction. However, the salient point here is that safe operating parameters for the Proposed Development would be established by means of a “soft start” with experienced pilots given ample support, and in benign conditions.</p> <p>HMM is confident that vessel</p>

	<p>indicates would operate at the proposed new berths. The effect of the current is then either pushing a vessel onto the infrastructure or pushing it away from the infrastructure. This is significant for the vessel in that it makes the approach to the terminal more challenging and, in particular, the manoeuvres to berths 2 and 3. It also results in greater risk to the Eastern Jetty, the Eastern Jetty Tug barge and most significantly a chemical tanker berthed at this location. However as the Applicant has failed to fully simulate berth 3 manoeuvres, having only conducted 1 such trial, it is difficult to fully appreciate or demonstrate these dangers. There has been, understandably, much attention given to the need for adequate risk mitigation around the IOT's operations given the nature of the cargoes handled at that facility and the proximity of the IOT Finger Pier to the Proposed Development. DFDS are keen that the Examining Authority and other IP's do not lose sight of the risks associated with the Eastern Jetty given the nature of the cargoes handled there and the exposure the berth and vessels moored there would face from vessels manoeuvring to and from IERRT Berths 2 & 3.</p> <p>The Eastern Jetty has the capacity to handle vessels up to 213m in length and a draught of over 10m, which are much larger than the coastal vessels using the IOT Finger Pier. The nature of the cargoes handled at the Eastern Jetty include acids, benzene compounds and inorganic compounds such as caustic soda. The potential for these cargoes to cause harm to human life, marine life and</p>	<p>movements can be managed safely. He would add, however, that in circumstances where tidal direction and current makes a particular manoeuvre challenging, it would be managed through such measures as use of tugs and operating in a tighter tidal window. It should still be capable of being managed safely.</p>
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	ecology is potentially even greater than with the oil products handled at the IOT Finger Pier. The Applicant has failed to identify any mitigations to guarantee the safety of the Eastern Jetty. This coupled with the lack of simulation to Berth 3 is a concern for DFDS.	
REP4-025 DFDS Summary of case made at ISH3		<i>Harbour Master, Humber Response</i> HMH explained at ISH 3 how an allision on the Humber would be managed, based on his practical experience. HMH is, of course, fully aware of the role of SOSREP and has worked collaboratively with the SOSREP both during real life incidents and emergency exercises.
	Of paragraph 3.6: DFDS do not consider the arrangement at the IOH with the Western Jetty to be comparable to that at the Proposed Development. DFDS will provide detailed reasons for this in written submissions, a particular differential to note is that there is no tidal influence inside the IOH, it is slack water, so the tide can be used in the river to manoeuvre a vessel into the right position. If a manoeuvre is not working there is plenty of space within the river to readjust, abort and realign. It is a much less complex manoeuvre that it would be at the Proposed Development. DFDS finds it surprising and concerning that the Harbour Master was not able to express a view on this at the hearing.	<i>Harbour Master, Humber Response</i> HMH does not recall being asked and then being unable to express a view on any matter at the hearing.
REP4-035 - IOTT comments on D3 submissions, responses to ExQ2 and other	Of the response to paragraph 2.1.1 of HMH's D3 submissions relating to IOT: Converse to the Applicant's	<i>Harbour Master, Humber Response</i> As a general point, HMH would like to point out that it is legally incorrect and not appropriate for IOT to refer to the Humber Master, Humber as "the

<p>ISH3 questions - Comments on HMM D3 submissions relating to IOT</p>	<p>comment regarding a master being 'dropped straight into the critical part of a manoeuvre'</p>	<p>Applicant". He is not the applicant for the Proposed Development.</p>
	<p><i>Of the response to paragraphs 2.2.1 to 2.2.3 of HMM's D3 submissions relating to IOT:</i></p> <p>An early decision to abort may have the benefit of time and planning, and therefore be conducted in a controlled manner e.g., when an inward vessel is advised early-on that its berth is no longer available, the visibility has fallen below an acceptable level or non-availability of towage. However, a decision to abort is normally taken when a manoeuvre has already been commenced and for some reason it is not going to plan e.g., the vessel is failing to respond as envisaged, wind stronger than predicted or an item of ship's equipment failed. It is therefore rarely undertaken from a position of comfort, prediction or safety. In this case there is no time for planning; remedial action has to be quick and intuitive to have any chance of success.</p> <p>Assumptions regarding the eventual heading or orientation of a vessel when forced to abort from a suboptimal situation may not be achievable in conditions of strong tidal flow or the effect of wind.</p> <p>An IOT tanker movement, even if prioritised over a concurrent other vessel movement, is always dependent on the progress of the vessel immediately ahead of it. Therefore, any consequent delay to an inbound or outbound tanker would impact IOT as described.</p>	<p>Harbour Master, Humber Response</p> <p>IOT Operators' commentary does not reflect abort planning on the Humber.</p> <p>On the Humber, an abort point is generally understood to be the point at which a large vessel can still safely proceed safely to sea or anchorage. A decision made at the late stage and for the reasons described by IOT is not considered an abort on the Humber. It would be an incident or near-miss (and would be treated accordingly).</p> <p>Abort points form an integral part of any vessel's passage plan – in this case, the last abort point would most likely be the point at which the vessel is stopped and lined up ready to move backwards into the berth. At this point the vessel is under control, moving very slowly and would be utilising control measures such as pilotage and towage. There would, therefore, be an awareness on the vessel's bridge of the conditions.</p> <p>Should an incident occur, mariners are trained to react, and additional control measures could, by way of example, include use of anchors.</p> <p>HMM is not making light of IOT's concerns but is clarifying what an abort is defined as on the Humber. The impression that a vessel would just carry on is not a fair representation of a planned passage, which is being continuously evaluated by the vessel's bridge team.</p> <p>With regard to the final paragraph, it is worth remembering that the number of additional vessel movements as a result of IERRT would be limited, and</p>

		they would be notified in advance to HES and programmed in the same way as all vessel movements are currently programmed, including those of IOT. HMM is not expecting a backlog of vessels to arise as a result of the introduction of the Proposed Development into the Humber.
	<p><i>Of the response to paragraphs 3.1.1 to 3.1.3 of HMM's D3 submissions relating to IOT:</i></p> <p>IOT Operators note that the HM agrees with the findings of the sNRA in relation to risk of hazard occurrence, and that similar control measures are identified. However, he does not confirm whether he agrees that measures such as impact protection, relocation of the finger pier and a Marine and Liaison Plan are required, despite three independent assessments confirming that they would reduce risk, and with the IOT sNRA confirming this through a detailed cost benefit approach.</p>	<p>Harbour Master, Humber Response</p> <p>HMM recognises the effect of all the potential controls which have been identified and are under consideration.</p>
Ditto	<p>Of the response to paragraph 3.1.4 of HMM's D3 submissions relating to IOT:</p> <p>The ABP Harbour Masters (HES Harbour Master and Port of Immingham Dock Master) undertake consultation through annual liaison meetings which IOT Operators attend. These meetings are not risk assessment or hazard workshops and primarily deal with promulgation of information by ABP. Where safety issues have been raised by IOT Operators these have often been brushed aside.</p>	<p>Harbour Master, Humber Response</p> <p>HMM is surprised by IOT's suggestion that where safety issues have been raised by IOT Operators, they have often been brushed aside. Any safety issue raised by an operator on the Humber – including IOT – is always given due consideration.</p> <p>All safety improvements that involve marine operations at the terminal have been developed collaboratively whether raised by IOT or HES.</p> <p>IOT's criticism ignores even the formal safety liaison meetings that are led through HES as well as the continuous dialogue between HES and the Marine Operations Team at IOT which</p>

	<p>IOT Operators have not been engaged in any regular formal risk assessment process to define and assess baseline (current) navigation risk, and identify and implement risk control measures needed to mitigate risk for either the ABP Humber Estuary Services statutory port area or the ABP Port of Immingham Statutory port area to acceptable levels.</p> <p>Analysis undertaken in the sNRA [REP2-064] shows the ABP Humber has the highest alision rate of any port with Ro-Ro traffic in the UK.</p> <p>Where specific navigation mitigation measures are in place for IOT, then these have often been led by IOT Operators keen to maintain the safety of IOT. As the existing baseline NRA for the area has not been shared with IOT, and neither has IOT Operators been engaged in either the production or continuous review of the baseline NRA. As a result IOT Operators are not able to comment on management risk and are not aware of whether these risk controls are contained within the ABP PMSC baseline NRA. For example, the limitation imposed on Coastal Tankers berthing only during flood tide conditions at the IOT Finger Pier, was implemented to protect the IOT Finger Pier and Trunkway, was raised and implemented by IOT Operators (in consultation with ABP Harbour Masters).</p>	<p>underpin safe marine operations at the terminal.</p> <p>With regard to the particular assertion that there is one liaison meeting a year: there have been 117 stakeholder meetings chaired by HES in the last 10 years relating to navigational safety and IOT is a standing member of 45 of those meetings. The above meetings form an important part of the stakeholder liaison required for compliance with the PMSC which is regularly audited and, as such, all meetings are minuted. The relevant Humber baseline NRA in MarNIS is often displayed at such meetings, and external parties have participated in risk assessments, including jetty operators and tug operators.</p> <p>HMH believes IOT Operators are aware of all the procedures and controls relating to their operations.</p>
	<p><i>Of the response to paragraphs 3.1.5 to 3.1.6 of HMH's D3 submissions relating to IOT:</i></p> <p>IOT Operators maintain that the content of REP2-064 is primarily</p>	<p>Harbour Master, Humber Response</p> <p>HMH stands by the content of paragraphs 3.1.5 and 3.1.6 of his earlier submission.</p>

	<p>factual and therefore is representative of the conduct of the simulations including in the paragraphs outlined by the Applicant.</p> <p>IOT Operators, and in particular NASH Maritime observers during sessions 1 and 2, highlighted the use of ship models which were suboptimal due to either length, handling characteristics or deadweight and demonstrated a collaborative approach themselves by suggesting alternatives with the aim of obtaining the most realistic outcomes from the simulation sessions for the benefit of all parties. Similarly, the introduction of wind shading, originally deemed as not required by ABP and HR Wallingford (“HRW”) was reluctantly introduced in a very limited number of simulation runs during Session 3. The eventual agreement of ABP and HRW to develop more appropriate ship models and wind shading for Session 3 was appreciated by IOT and did indeed highlight issues not apparent during Sessions 1 and 2.</p> <p>IOT operators question the independent nature of HMM given that he is an employee of the Applicant. It is correct that in many of the simulation runs, IOT observers confirmed that they were content and in agreement with the recorded outcomes. However, in others, contrary opinions verbally expressed by observers were either ignored, derided or overruled by HMM and were not always correctly reflected in the HRW report. Session 3 post event discussion was held in an adjacent room at the request of HMM between HRW/ABP and NASH/IOT at which concerns regarding the outcomes from some</p>	<p>In respect of aspersions cast by IOT on his independence, HMM refers to his separate note (see HMM 19).</p>
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	<p>simulation runs was voiced and agreement was not reached.</p> <p>There was a pre-determined scripted run plan during Session 3 and no time for observers to request additional runs, if required, due to the intended use by ABP of the simulation facility to commence simulations on another project.</p> <p>With regard to paragraph 91, in order to realistically determine the time taken to conduct a manoeuvre and therefore understand the impact to other river and lock traffic in the compact area adjacent to Immingham Lock bellmouth, and therefore the risk, it is necessary to allow simulations to progress independent of interference by facilitators. Facilitators should also allow an aborted manoeuvre to complete in order to demonstrate that such an abort can be safely concluded rather than simply terminating an exercise 'for the sake of time'.</p> <p>In relation to paragraph 94, the scenario was agreed between ABP, HRW and Stena but not by IOT (or DFDS) in their capacity as observers. IOT therefore supports that comment in paragraphs 94 and 95 of REP2-064 is justified and correct, especially in that more scenarios should have been trialled, with greater stern speed and a greater time delay in deploying anchor(s) including an event where anchors were unable to be deployed at all.</p> <p>In respect of paragraph 97, it is correct that Rix Phoenix PEC holder stated that he would need to (and potentially could) amend his current approach due to the intended footprint of IOT infrastructure.</p>	
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	<p>However, he also commented that some manoeuvres, especially those currently taking place on spring tides and in high winds would not be possible with the proposed IERRT infrastructure in place.</p>	
<p>Ditto</p>	<p>Of the response to paragraph 3.1.7 of HMH's D3 submissions relating to IOT:</p> <p>IOT agrees with the Applicant that any Pilotage, especially that on the Humber and in particular the density of traffic, tidal regime and mutual proximity of terminals in the Immingham area can be extremely challenging, especially navigating in an area so close to an existing multi-berth Oil Terminal. Therefore, IOT reiterate that the IERRT terminal should not be placed in such close proximity to an area that requires such challenging pilotage where allision could result in catastrophic consequences.</p> <p>In other UK ports, pilots, whilst following the prescribed training matrix for that port, are expected to advance to authorisation for the largest vessels as soon as possible. Humber Pilotage is unusual in that it limits (and routinely fails to meet) the number of authorised Class 1 pilots i.e., those with sufficient experience and authorisation to conduct design vessels to IERRT.</p> <p>As a result of this policy, advancement above Class 2 is seen by pilots themselves as discretionary, whereby many choose to remain at a lower grade in recognition that acts of pilotage on smaller vessels generally are less</p>	<p>Harbour Master, Humber Response</p> <p>As stated above, as a matter of law, apart from anything else, HMH is not the applicant for the IERRT scheme, and he refers the ExA document HMH 19.</p> <p>HMH said that all pilotage at Immingham is challenging. He did not say that all pilotage at Immingham is “<i>extremely</i>” challenging; particularly given the expertise of the pilots and PECs on the Humber and the fact that many of them have familiarity accrued over years of making the same manoeuvres on a regular basis. HMH repeats his opinion, based on his experience and expertise that safety will be managed for IERRT just as it is for the other destinations on the Humber.</p> <p>HMH is comfortable that the numbers of those pilots qualified and authorised to pilot vessels of the type that will be using IERRT (i.e Class 1 and VLS (very large ship) pilots) will be sufficient to cater for the demand arising from its introduction.</p> <p>The limit, which HES, as Competent Harbour Authority (CHA), calls the “establishment figure” referred to by IOT includes both a raw required number and additional positions for professional and career development purposes.</p> <p>In regard to training, there is a track record over many years of delivery by the CHA of appropriate training for pilots where new infrastructure is</p>

	<p>onerous and stressful than conducting the largest ships.</p> <p>This results in the roster of pilots suitably authorised for IERRT vessels being substantially undermanned and pilots being fully occupied during rostered periods.</p> <p>Tripping on vessels to IERRT or attending simulation training would therefore rely on a very limited number of off-watch pilots making themselves available for training to coincide with a time when ships and/or simulation facilities are available.</p> <p>This would be difficult to administer and cannot be guaranteed.</p> <p>Pilots could (and do) elect to make themselves unavailable for training for berths which they deem to be particularly challenging so that they effectively avoid being authorised for them. In undergoing 'appropriate' training and in recognition of the agreed complexities of manoeuvring at IERRT, it is presumed that an individual pilot would be required to undertake at least as many arrival and departure manoeuvres from each IERRT berth or the terminal as a PEC holder.</p> <p>Humber PEC guidelines state the PEC requirement as 9 trips in and 9 trips out of the dock, plus one tug trip in and one tug trip out (see appendix to this document). However, it is noted that the current training requirement for pilot authorisation to the terminals at IOH and HRT, which are technically easier, is only 'one trip in and one trip out' per terminal (not per berth). This level of familiarisation would be wholly</p>	<p>introduced into the Humber estuary. Such training is normally initially undertaken by a small cadre of pilots and PECs on a simulator who would then jointly undertake the early voyages before experience is cascaded through on board training.</p> <p>The suggestion being made that the provision of pilot training for the IERRT would somehow be less capable of delivery than has been the experience in the past is, in the view of HMH, without foundation.</p> <p>The provision of pilotage on the Humber meets the requirements of the PMSC and its compliance is monitored and audited in line with the requirements of the Code.</p>
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	<p>inadequate for a terminal with the degree of complexity and difficulty posed by IERRT and the ethos of a Humber Pilot being ‘jack of all trades but master of none’ would be wholly inadequate for a terminal with the agreed complexities of IERRT.</p> <p>Given that the terminal does not yet exist, it is not clear how each PEC holder would obtain the required number of trips in and out prior to commissioning. Initial pilotage authorisation for a terminal is just the first step. A total of up to approximately 50 Class 1 pilots, once ‘trained’ would have little opportunity to remain individually familiar with the terminal when the vast majority of pilotage acts each year would be undertaken by PEC holders.</p> <p>IOT Operators note that the Applicant has made no comment regarding the content of paragraph 109-111.</p>	<p>We assume this comment is aimed at ABP as Applicant and not HMM.</p>
<p>Submissions – page 30 onwards</p>	<p>a) The management of an allision or collision incident within the Port of Immingham by the Dock Master and the Harbour Master Humber.</p> <p>1.1. IOT Operators note that the ABP Harbour Master Humber and the ABP Dock Master Immingham (collectively the ABP Harbour Masters) manage allision and collision risk through their Marine Safety Management Systems which are development based on the production of the NRA (this is a requirement of the PMSC [REP1-015]).</p> <p>1.2. The PMSC states at para. 10 that</p>	<p><i>Harbour Master, Humber Response</i></p> <p>HMM has responded to this point in his response to the criticism of paragraph 3.1.4 of HMM’s D3 submissions relating to IOT on page 20 of this document.</p>

	<p>Harbour Authorities should have a “Marine Safety Management System: Operate an effective MSMS which has been developed after consultation, is based on formal risk assessment and refers to an appropriate approach to incident investigation.”</p> <p>1.3. The ABP Harbour Masters undertaken consultation through annual liaison meetings, which the IOT Operators attend. These meetings are not hazard workshops and primarily deal with promulgation of information from ABP. Where safety issues have been raised by IOT Operators these have often been brushed aside.</p> <p>1.4. IOT Operators have not been engaged in any formal risk assessment process to define and assess the baseline (current) navigation risk for the area, and identify and implement risk control measures needed to mitigate risk for either the ABP Humber Estuary Services statutory port area or the ABP Port of Immingham Statutory port area.</p> <p>1.5. Where specific mitigation measures are in place for IOT, then these are often led by IOT Operators, who do not know whether these risk controls are contained within the ABP PMSC baseline NRA. For example, the limitation imposed on Coastal Tankers berthing only during flood tide conditions at the IOT Finger Pier, implemented to protect the IOT Finger Pier and Trunkway, was raised and implemented by IOT Operators (in consultation with ABP Harbour Masters).</p> <p>1.6. When incidents have historically occurred, involving vessels berthing</p>	<p>HMH does not consider this a fair reflection of how incidents at IPT have</p>
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	<p>and departing the IOT, IOT Operators are often not provided with incident reports (or even invited to attend and assist with investigations) or provided with corrective actions taken by ABP Harbour Masters. For example, this is evident for recent incidents involving ABP pilot error at IOT where IOT Operators have still 31 not been provided with incident investigation reports into Selin S (28 July 2022) and Heinrich (19 March 2023) incidents (noted at Section 8.2.2 and 8.2.3 of the IOT sNRA).</p>	<p>been dealt with. There is a track record over many years of working together both during and after incidents through direct dialogue in addition to formal safety liaison meetings.</p>
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